Regional Differences in Arb Countries’ Young Female Radicalization

Introduction

The Arab States region has the second-widest gender gap globally, behind South Asia, with women making 14% less progress in human development than men. This inequality hinders the region’s ability to achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda. Despite national policies and legislation to combat gender inequality, progress has been slower than the global average. The region’s legal systems deny women and girls equal rights and access to courts, preventing social and economic disempowerment [1].

The Arab world faces persistent gender discrepancies, particularly in employment, due to factors such as oil, patriarchal cultures, colonialism, and religious interpretations. Female unemployment in the region has only increased in recent years, rising from 18% in 2000 to nearly 22% in 2020. The unpaid workforce disproportionately includes Arab women, who outperform men in this crucial type of labor. The Arab world has the most restrictive gender norms, with restricted freedom of movement, workplace legislation, salary inequities, and limitations on women- led entrepreneurship. Women face significant obstacles in their pursuit of safe jobs, with only 20% of seats in national parliaments and fewer than 10% in affluent Gulf states. Public administration, education, health care, and agriculture employ over two-thirds of women, with the percentage of women in agriculture declining from 41% in 2000 to 23% in 2022. The services sector has seen a 20% increase in female employment over the last 20 years. The most gender-inequitable regions in the Arab world, such as the Gaza Strip, Yemen, and Syria, also have poor humanitarian results. Ensuring female participation does not guarantee peace or prosperity, but neglecting the viewpoint of half the population, who are disproportionately responsible for the survival and well-being of households and communities, is a mistake [2].

Along with more conventional forms of violence like sexual abuse and wife-battering, Arab women experience specific forms of domestic violence throughout their lives, including: disrespect, honor-related violence against married and unmarried women, carelessness, female genital mutilation, lack of education or access to education, confinement at home, sexual abuse, child marriages, forced marriages, temporary and polygamous marriages, and abuse by other family members (brothers, parents, and in-laws). They encounter many sorts of sexual assault and commercial exploitation when they are not at home [3].

People often perceive the issue of women becoming radicalized terrorists as a male-only problem, viewing them as powerless, passive, victims, and mothers in conflict situations. However, it is not inherently more dangerous than men, and terrorist organizations often exploit the image of a calm woman to attract new members. Raising awareness of violent extremist messaging and recruitment tactics is crucial, and the media should avoid perpetuating stereotypes about women’s roles. The misconception that women are not involved in violent extremism or terrorist radicalization, which exacerbates their underrepresentation in law enforcement and security personnel, requires further scientific investigation. Both parents and society must address the risk of terrorist radicalization, especially between the ages of 12 and 20, to prevent the spread of violent extremist narratives [4].

The role of gender in radicalization and the prevention and countering of violent extremism (PCVE) has not been fully discussed in academic research. In a study on women’s radicalization in Jordan, just 13% of respondents thought that women were under greater pressure than men to radicalize, 31% thought that men were under more pressure, and 53% thought that both men and women were equally affected by these influences. Intolerant remarks are seen by both men and women as a blatant sign of radicalism among Jordanians, but women respondents—particularly female university students—were significantly more likely to see conservative attire as a sign. Outside of metropolitan areas, women have also pointed to the marginalization of women’s roles in society as a sign of radicalism. Many believe that embracing more conservative religious beliefs and behaviors is correlated with signs of women being radicalized. The respondents listed a number of different factors as possible catalysts for the radicalization of women and girls. These included financial and economic pressures (69%) and social and family issues, such as domestic abuse and barriers preventing women from exercising their rights, like inheritance (34%) [5].

Studies reveal that women who joined Da’esh or ISIS have distinct backgrounds and sociodemographic compositions. A sense of adventure, the possibility of marriage, the desire to contribute to the establishment of an ideal Islamic state, the desire to be a part of something greater and more divine, and the felt moral obligation to assist their Muslim brothers and sisters are just a few of the reasons behind their actions. The problem of radicalization is intricate and multifaceted. Comprehending and addressing female radicalization necessitates an identical, multifaceted strategy. Moreover, it is advisable to use caution when incorporating findings about heightened susceptibility to radicalization into policies and initiatives, as posited by several experts. Categorizing particular groups as being more susceptible to radicalization may backfire since it exacerbates stigma and alienation [6]. Some studies found females were significantly higher than males on the violent extremist scale [7]. Studies in the region lack valid measures of radicalization [8] and showed that females are higher in radicalization than men, but it is rare to move from radicalization to terrorism [9]. Social macro- and individual micro factors attributed to radicalization for both males and females [10]. Males and females were victims of radicalization [11] and [12]. Causes of radicalization like isolation as a result of marginalization, inequality, alienation, and restrictions in public areas. Women and girls are frequently more vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment [13, 14, 15, 16]. Levels of radicalization for both males and females are at an alarming point in universities [17, 18]. Fears of future terrorism [19]. This study describes the levels of radicalization among Arb youth women and examines the regional variations in the levels of radicalization of young women in the Arab world among women from 12 Arab states.

Methodology

The study selected a sample of 2326 young female students. Of these, 1180 (50.7%) are from GCC countries, 521 (22.4%) are from North Africa, and 625 (26.9%) are from the Levant countries.

Discussion

Twelve Arab states (the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain; Levant: Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria; North Africa: Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria) participated in the study. This study reveals the prevailing levels of radicalization among Arab young females in three culturally different regions (the GCC, North Africa, and Levan countries). According to the European Commission, radicalization is a growing intolerantness towards democratic values and a tendency to use force to achieve political goals that undermine democracy [22]. The present study looks at regional differences in the degrees of radicalization of young women in the Arab world. Women in the GCC expressed a greater level of radicalization than women in the Levant, with women in North African countries having the lowest rates. Women in the Mediterranean and Africa are voicing their concerns against violence and Islamophobia, highlighting the role of radical Islam in promoting violence. They are advocating for women’s rights, Islamic feminism, resistance, challenging biases, and seeking justice.

Despite being in different regions, women in these areas are increasingly facing the same challenges.

Algerian women, for instance, faced societal discrimination and violence in the 1980s due to the 1984 Family Code and patriarchal society. Amnesty International declared that women have little hope for justice and redress for abuses, and current laws continue to perpetuate discrimination and violence [23].

The majority of the radicals thoughts and beliefs focused on three pillars: power (religious, social, and cultural), authority (family, tribe, and state), and status (men’s seniority, women’s reputation, taboos and women’s tribe honor). These pillars are governed by a holy shell, which makes them unquestionable and taken for granted. While women’s honor and senior tribal status were higher in North African and Levantine countries, women in GCC countries outperformed the grand mean in terms of religious, social, and formal authority.

Findings showed there are notable disparities in female radicalization between the three regions (GCC, North Africa, and Levant countries). Such differences can be explained by the differences in the above pillars and the power of each one of them as a behavioral reference in the life of women. The prevalence of high levels of radicalization is also due to Arab women’s status and socialization process. Women are socialized and educated formally and informally, with a heavy dose of power and authority over social, cultural, and religious taboos. This type of social environment can lead to radicalization, but it is rare for it to lead to terrorism. The findings of this study call attention to the importance of understanding women’s radicalization.

Recruiters exploit factors such as alienation, social marginalization, xenophobia, limited opportunities, and psychological issues to influence women’s radicalization. Due to certain “push” factors, like isolation as a result of marginalization, inequality, alienation, and restrictions in public areas, The rejection of Western feminism, online recruitment, peer influence, ISIS ideology, naivety, romantic optimism, and the opportunity to be part of something new influence young women in Western countries to join ISIS. Radicalization is often the culmination of economic, social, and political factors, and women’s normative expectations contribute to their decision to join ISIS. Men often use violence to advance their political, social, economic, or religious beliefs. Women have historically participated in extremist movements and played a crucial role in preventing and countering radicalization. Al-Badayneh, et al. [21] examine the sympathy and support for terrorist groups like ISIS among college students in Jordan. It found that 59% of students expressed radical thoughts, with 66% carrying extreme ideas and 90.7% accepting violence. More than half of the sample expressed conservative thoughts, including stoning adultery cases and segregation of women in the workplace. About 10% of students expressed behavioral and material support for ISIS, with the lowest justification being for seeing ISIS as a defender of Islam. The study found a significant relationship between radical thoughts, violent extremism beliefs, conservative beliefs, stress, victimization, and justification, explaining 56% of the variance in behavioral and material support for ISIS.

Conclusion

Women and girls are frequently more vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment. On the other hand, little is known about the causes of their radicalization and how they cope with it. How women become radicalized and how to empower them to prevent radicalization. Moreover, it is essential to include women in lawmaking, law enforcement, and deradicalization and radicalization preventive plans. The question of women’s bias and misconceptions often frames terrorist radicalization, portraying women as passive, victims, and helpless, thereby reinforcing gender stereotypes. However, we should not assume that women are more dangerous or prone to peace, dialogue, and cooperation than men. Terrorist groups use this image to recruit women. Women play a crucial role in countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT). Women can contribute significantly by shaping policies, educating the public, and promoting community engagement. They can provide feedback on international counter-terrorism efforts and identify counterproductive practices. Addressing specific political, social, economic, cultural, or educational concerns can help women’s organizations effectively combat violent extremism and terrorist radicalization. Families and society must address the terrorist radicalization risk by requiring parents to respond to their children’s questions about their religious, political, and cultural identities. Inability to openly discuss critical questions could lead to violent extremist narratives, affecting personalities and values between 12 and 20. Policymakers should involve women in prevention and intervention efforts for female radicalization and recruitment. This includes promoting local grassroots initiatives, avoiding demonizing specific groups, offering training to professionals, encouraging women’s participation, and ensuring the quality of prevention and intervention programs. Intervention programs should account for gender expectations and avoid stereotyping women as passive in radicalization. Governments should engage with grassroots women’s organizations to better understand and support vulnerable individuals. Grassroots movements have better access to vulnerable individuals and often have a more diverse viewpoint. Public authorities should identify key women activists and organizations, assess which state agency is best placed to engage with women, and maintain transparency for credibility in the eyes of broader communities and the public. Theoretical radicalization models for women Radicalization emphasizes the need for multilevel analysis, considering factors such as personal agency, identity, structural pressures, and organizational opportunities. Pull-and-pull factors include ideological messages, societal pressures, and enabling factors like charismatic preachers, radical mosques, prisons, and recruitment sites .

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