The Moral Foreign Language Effect: Do Languages Influence How We Make Moral Decisions?

Introduction

The moral judgment of an incident or the construction of morality is a circumstance that develops in tandem with people’s instinctual states. Globalization unavoidably causes a rise in the number of individuals hearing and acquiring new languages. Independent choices are heavily influenced by such newly acquired languages. Although a considerable study has been conducted on the language-thought dilemma in recent decades, the spotlight on the influence of language on cognitive processes such as moral decision-making is fresh and in vogue. According to findings, people frequently create various moral judgements based on the language in which the moral problem is conveyed [1]. Indeed, it has been discovered that a second language learned after adolescence frequently evokes lesser emotional reactions than a native language. However, before delving deeper into that topic, we must first consider our cognition, or, in other words, the connection between cognitive decision-making and language, known as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. While this concept is concerned with the relationship between language and reasoning, the interplay between language and morality is not the same as problems concerning language and cognition. Following the investigation of the premise, I will define ethics and morality. It may be challenging to understand the impact of language on our moral judgments until these and similar issues are addressed.

Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: Why Does it Matter?

Language is a pattern that is learnt in the human condition, and this inclination encourages individuals to gain insight into the world and society. Language is such a significant motivator that we, as humans, regard it as a method of experiencing existence. Countless theorists and linguists have taken note of this aspect, and numerous research papers have been presented to highlight the link between cognition and language. For example, the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis, named after linguists Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir, is among the most prominent and fundamental. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has spurred debate and study in fields as wide-ranging as linguistics, psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and education since its introduction in the 1920s and 1930s.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis contends that language impacts our style of thinking by building our mental schema, which determines how we view the world. As Sapir stated ‘’human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language habits of the group.’’ Many people have been captivated by Sapir’s words, which have stimulated a great body of literature [2]. Many concept mapping on language- thought issues have been conducted based on Sapir’s study, and many anthropologists, linguists, and sociologists regard the Sapir-Whorf theorem as an appropriate precursor. To support Sapir and Whorf’s argument, I would like to explore two terms having lingua-cultural significance. The initial word is ‘’gentile,’’ whereas the other is ‘’goyim.’’ Although the earlier and latter words are translated as ‘’non-Jews,’’ the original connotation of the second term, ‘’goyim,’’ is negative for Jews. Although ‘’gentile’’ is a fairly neutral phrase, ‘’goy’’ has a negative connotation, alluding to an individual who is cruel and unsympathetic. A further instance is contrasting my native language, Kurdish, with English. I juxtapose these two languages to provide a concrete example of the linguistic relativity argument. The English term ‘’wise’’ corresponds to two Kurdish phrases. The primary is aaqil, while the next is zaanaa. When we analyze the definition of the term ‘’wise,’’ it appears to entail having sufficient information or expertise about a subject. Although the Kurdish word zaanaa is a similar translation of the word ‘’wise,’’ the word aaqil, however, is not the exact translation of the term ‘’wise.’’ Aaqil is also used as ‘’brain and mentality.’’ As a result, a Kurd using the word aaqil and an Englishman using the word ‘’wise’’ may not refer to the equal context. This and related cases have been a topic of discussion among philosophers who understand more than one language. The renowned thinkers of German romanticism were among the philosophers who were antecedents of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and thought it equally important.

The concept of various ethnic groupings was the motivating factor behind the original doctrines of the German Romantic Movement and ethnic nationalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. For instance, it is frequently claimed that Johann Georg Hamann was the first true German Romantic to introduce the notion of linguistic genius. In his work, titled Essay Concerning an Academic Question, Haman articulates that ‘’the lineaments of their language will thus correspond to the direction of their mentality [3].’’ In 1820, Wilhelm von Humboldt-another romantic thinker from Germany-recommended paying special emphasis to language instruction, saying that it serves as the mental building block. He asserts that thoughts develop in the speaker’s mind as a sort of internal dialogue using the same grammar. As a result, he asserted that the variety of a language is not diversity of sounds and signs but rather of worldviews.

Following German romanticism, the study of language acquired favour on another continent, America, through philosophy and anthropology. For example, among the earliest American linguists to focus on the tenacity of language was William Dwight Whitney, who generated a variety of theses such as ‘’the supremacy of languages’’ or ‘’primitive language’’ and published ideas in journals and textbooks. He considered Indian languages as an impediment to western life. Hence, Whitney argued for the elimination of such ‘’primitive languages.’’ He not only published in favour of the abolition of Native American languages in America, but he also aggressively attempted to exterminate Native American dialects. Whitney’s theory or notion, such as ‘’primitive’’ or ‘’superiority of languages,’’ has both followers and detractors.

The American anthropologist Franz Boas is at the forefront of sceptics, believing that there is no such thing as ‘’primitive language,’’ and that language is hence an integral and completely detached aspect of society. Franz Boas’ findings of the present study on languages originate from his expertise in Native American languages. According to Boas, every civilization must be observed in its unique setting and within the scope of living activities. Boas’ cultural relativist viewpoint was not shared by his pupil, Edward Sapir, who abandoned Boas’ linguistic vision in favour of the Humboldian axiom of language, which holds that languages hold the key to comprehending people’s world perspectives.

Both Sapir and Whorf claimed that human language and culture have a deep link and that this association impacts how we organize our thoughts and our behavioural patterns in the world. Sapir proposed that it is hard to entirely convert two distinct languages into one another since linguistic rules such as grammar are produced variously, and thus each person can perceive various images in their brain. As Sapir puts it, ‘’ no two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached’’ [2]. Sapir made a strong case for the relationship for both language and culture in his conclusions. Both language and culture are neither fully or especially deeply intertwined.

It is simple to demonstrate that language and culture are not inextricably linked. A specific language or even a group of highly associated but independent languages might belong to several cultural realms. Native Americans in America have a wealth of clear examples. The Athabaskan languages are the most functionally distinct and visibly united set of tongues. These languages, in Sapir’s view, are spoken by people from four distinctive ethnic groups. The Athabaskan- speaking peoples’ capacity for cultural adaptation stands in stark juxtaposition to the languages’ inherent resistance to outside influences. While Sapir was not interested in explicitly investigating how languages impact the mind, his basic engagement of language offers proof of the idea of linguistic relativity. Sapir’s revolutionary notion of linguistic relativity was eventually transferred and extended by his disciple, Benjamin Lee Whorf.

Whorf researched Native American languages to better understand how morphological structures and language utilization influence consciousness. Yet, some of Whorf’s core beliefs give some insight into his understanding of linguistic relativity. Whorf, for instance, posits that terms may have various meanings across different languages since they are formed of a distinct letter and sound combinations. Various interpretations bring different components to existence in the imaginations of humans. Whorf not only expanded on Sapir’s notion of a language-culture paradigm, but he went far further in his objectives. In his short article Language Plan and Conception of Arrangement, published in 1938, he emphasized all aspects of language, namely phonology, rhetoric and speech.

In this sense, Whorf envisioned these multiple aspects or features of language as integral parts of a larger whole. In Whorf’s words; ‘’we dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way-an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language [...] all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated’’ [4].

One of Whorf’s most well-known instances of linguistic relativity is when an indigenous language has many phrases for a notion that is described by just one vocabulary in European languages. Whorf used the so-called numerous terms for the word snow in the Inuit language as an illustration. Another example is the Hopi term for water, which has two meanings: one for potable water in a container and the other for a natural body of water. These phraseological examples had the twin function of demonstrating that indigenous languages made more complex semantic differences than European languages and that even seemingly simple notions like snow or water were not always immediately rendered between the two languages. Whorf’s most detailed argument for linguistic relativity was what he believed to be a fundamental difference in the understanding of time as a conceptual category among Hopi society. Unlike English, Hopi society treats the flow of time not as a series of distinct, countable categories such as ‘’three days’’ or ‘’five weeks’’ but rather as a single process, and as a result, there are no nouns to refer to units of time as English speakers would understand it. He proposed that this perspective on time is crucial to Hopi culture and that by taking such language distinctions into account, we might comprehend the behavioral patterns of many nations and communities.

The shifts that occurred in both psychology and politics in the 1980s and 1990s drove both psychologists and political scientists to gravitate to the linguistic relativity theory. George Lakoff, an American cognitive linguist and philosopher, was one of many who took a more Whorfian stance. Languages, according to Lakoff, are frequently employed as metaphors, and he believed that distinct cultural allegories indicate something about how users of that language operate. Lakoff revisited linguistic relativity, notably Whorf’s beliefs on how language categorization mirrors and impacts cognitive categories, in his book Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things:

What Categories Reveal about the Mind.

While justifying his Whorfian linguistic relativity thesis, Lakoff makes the ‘’conceptually thinking’’ or ‘’conceptual relativism’’ claim. According to him, languages not only contain diverse vocabulary but also mental peculiarities according to society’s memories and the analogies they utilize. He believes that defining relativism only via a specific term, such as culture or religion, is insufficient. His relativism description includes experiences, words used by civilizations, metaphors, and the things implied by these terms. In Lakoff’s words, ‘’different people may have different domains of experience that are highly structured. Given a general conceptualizing capacity and a language capacity, they can conceptualize and name structured aspects of that domain of experience’’ [5]. The author suggests that humans build distinct realities by employing various archetypes. The pronouns, adjectives, or other grammatical modifiers used to identify things to allow cultures to generate narratives, which in turn produce distinct realities. As he continues, ‘’concepts which not to be are found objectively in nature, but which are a result of the human imaginative capacity: cognitive models involving metaphor and metonymy, radial categories, and nonuniversal socially constructed concepts. And, as we have repeatedly observed, such concepts can be made real by human action. These characterize important ways in which conceptual systems may differ across cultures. They are particularly interesting because they involve different uses of our imaginative capacities to create social reality’’ [5].

However, Lakoff requests attention to the distinction between conceptual systems and conceptualizing capacities. First, pre-conceptual experiences that are highly structured may vary. By stating the first difference, he gives an example of Cora, who lives in the mountains of Mexico. The basic hill shape (top, slope, bottom) is a highly organized and essential part of Cora’s daily experience because they live in the Mexican mountains. Not only has it been theorized, but it has also been conventionalized and included in Cora’s grammar. Although Cora speakers have the same ability to conceptualize as we do, they have a unique system that seems to derive from a unique sort of underlying spatial perception. Second, identical experiences could serve as equally strong motivation for two somewhat different conceptual systems, since experience does not decide conceptual systems; it just inspires them. For instance, the metaphorical extension of the idea of ‘front’ to other things begins with its basic categorization in the body. In English, it is extended to objects like bushes as follows: the side that faces you is the bush’s ‘’front’’ when you are looking at it.

The opposite is true in Hausa: the ‘’front’’ of the bush is the side that is facing away from you, or in the opposite direction from where you are facing. Both options are consistent with our experience and equally fair. The same thinking ability and experiences can guide in these circumstances. Third, while sharing the same fundamental experiences and conceptualizing abilities, it is nonetheless possible for one system to be missing a crucial notion that another system possesses. Levy, cites Lakoff, ‘’has described an extreme instance of this type of ‘’hypo-cognition. Levy discovered that Tahitians appear to have no notion of melancholy and no ritualized behaviour for coping with depression or grief. They also don’t have a name for sadness. They seem to be depressed and melancholy, but they don’t know how to handle it. They associate sorrow with ill health, exhaustion, or demonic possession’’ [5].

Lakoff continues to defend his place and suggests that while defining relativism, attention should also be paid to the translations and meanings made. For him, it is crucial to recognize the distinction between capacity and system. This is because a theory that does not acknowledge a conceptualizing ability makes fundamentally different assertions regarding interpretation and comprehension. Discussions about relativism frequently include problems with interpretation and translation. Lakoff concatenates reasons as follows; first, he says, it is stated that translation from one language to another is impossible if the conceptual systems of the two languages are substantially dissimilar. Second, it is frequently asserted that if a translation is impossible, then speakers of one language cannot comprehend speakers of the other. Third, it is frequently asserted that if languages have distinct conceptual systems, then someone who knows one language would be unable to learn the other because he lacks the appropriate conceptual system. Fourth, it is frequently maintained that while humans may learn fundamentally different languages, such languages cannot have diverse conceptual systems.

Such statements, Lakoff believes, may appear to make sense if only conceptual systems and not conceptualizing skills are recognized. However, assuming that persons have a general conceptualizing capacity independent of variances in conceptual systems, the picture changes. Differences in conceptual systems do cause translation challenges. Lakoff examples speakers of two languages as having nearly the same basic experiences and conceptualising the same areas of experiences. Nonetheless, he believes, their conceptual frameworks are distinct, making translation difficult. It would still be feasible for a speaker of one language to learn the other in this case. The rationale is that one has the same conceptualizing abilities and fundamental experiences as the other. Once’s conceptualizing capacity would allow him/ her to build the other conceptual system as he/she went and grasp it through the shared pre-conceptual experiencing framework. Even though one cannot interpret the other language, he/she may be able to understand it. Close

correspondences across conceptual systems are required for accurate translation: comprehension merely requires correspondences in well-structured experiences and a shared conceptualizing ability. In summary, Lakoff thinks that disparities in conceptual systems do not always exclude comprehension and learning. And just because one may learn a completely different language does not imply that it lacks a distinct conceptual structure.

The distinction between translation and comprehension, Lakoff makes, is that translation necessitates a mapping from one language to another. Understanding is something that a person has inside themselves. It is related to his capacity to conceive and connect those notions to his experiences on the one hand, and to the expressions of the new language on the other. Translation can occur without the capability of comprehension, and comprehension can occur without the possibility of translation.

People disagree on whether the organization of conceptual systems is important in determining if two languages have different conceptual systems. This problem, in Lakoff’s mind, may have been dubbed any of the following:

• The Problem of Truth-Conditional Semantics
• The Sentence-by-Sentence Translation Issue
• The Polysemy Issue Lakoff proceeds with another example by examining the Otomanguean language of Western Mexico. Spatial positions are comprehended in Chalcatongo Mixtec, an Otomanguean language of Western Mexico, through the metaphorical projection of body-part names onto things. As an illustration, if you wish to say, ‘’the stone is under the table’’ in their language, you say: ‘’ yuu wa hiyaa cii-mesa,’’ which word- by-word comes out stone the be-located belly-table, where ‘’belly-table’’ is a possessive construction equivalent to ‘’the table’s belly [5]’’. The use of body-part projections to communicate relative location is systematic throughout the language; the language lacks a structure like the Indo- European prepositions and cases. It is not simply a question of employing those words to express our notions; rather, it is a matter of methodically comprehending physical places through conceptual relationships among bodily components.

Consider a few instance scenarios in which English speakers would employ a preposition, such as on. The fundamental spatial usage of on in English makes use of three picture schemas—CONTACT, SUPPORT, and ABOVE— that constitute a single conceptual unit [5]. There is no such conceptual unit with that structure in Mixtec. Instead, many body-part notions are employed. Assume you wish to state, ‘’he is at the top of the mountain.’’ The Mixtec equivalent would then be: ‘’’ he is located the mountain’s head.’’ In fact, ‘’head’’ is employed not just for on top of, but also for the area above. Sticking to the translation alternatives of on, let us state ‘’I was on the roof.’’ Because roofs in that area of the globe are horizontal and lack an upper tip, the head will not suffice. Alternatively, the phrase for an animal’s back is employed, because animal backs are horizontal. Another illustration by Lakoff would be, ‘’ if you want to say I am sitting on the branch of the tree, you say the equivalent of I am sitting on the tree’s arm or to say my son is lying on the mat, you say the equivalent of my son is lying the mat’s face [5]’’.

In summary, Mixtec languages have traditional techniques of figuratively transferring bodily parts onto things to perceive spatial position. We can comprehend the Mixtec structure because we, too, are capable of metaphorical projection of this type, even though our mental framework is not normally arranged in this manner. Such arrangements are hardly uncommon nor strange. Similar methods for communicating geographic position through body-part notions are ubiquitous in indigenous languages of Mesoamerica and Africa, while the details vary greatly [5]. The above basic perspective, as well as Lakoff’s results when investigating languages, provide a comprehensive picture but also confirmation of the purpose of language in shaping society’s existence and ethos. Whorf considered that languages had distinct and incommensurable conceptual frameworks. In terms of value, however, he was an idealist. He trusted in a pragmatist world and that some, but not all, conceptual systems constructed within language were suitable for fitting it with adequate precision. He felt that conceptual frameworks vary between languages, but that certain languages were more precise so better for undertaking science—than others. Whorf, Lakoff insists, ‘’ believed Hopi was ideally equipped to outward reality—physical reality—than English [5]’’.

According to Lakoff’s book, language and reality dilemmas are dualisms that are not autonomous of one another. Language, which is the outcome of perceptions, conveys reality while taking into account both geographical and cultural circumstances. Concepts, in Lakoff’s view, that have become part of a language’s grammar are utilized in thinking rather than only as objects of consciousness, and they are employed impulsively, instinctively, subconsciously, and freely. Lakoff is a cognitive scientist who is involved in not simply what our concepts are, but also how they are often used. Whorf’s points persuade Lakoff that the way we adopt ideas influences how we perceive reality; concepts that are instantaneous, instinctive, and unconscious will have higher repercussions on how we comprehend daily existence than concepts that we passively consider. To him, conceptual systems vary if they regularly contribute to diverse interpretations of experience. As a result, conceptual systems with various conceptions are specific elements to him. Do, then, the concepts or phrases we choose to illustrate a point have any influence on moral decision-making, according to Lakoff and Whorff’s assertions? Before we can address this question, we must first define morality and ethics. Similarly, assertions made without a thorough comprehension of these words will be invalid [6].

Morality and Ethics

In theory, the words ethics and morality have been used simultaneously, while some professions such as academics, politics, or religion will establish delineation from time to time. Morality is the distinction between correct (right) attitudes, judgments, and deeds from inappropriate (wrong) commitments, choices, and behaviours. Morality and ethics are indeed concerned with discriminating in both ‘’good and bad’’ or ‘’right and wrong.’’ Many people would consider morality to be a concept subjective and conventional, whereas ethics refers to the ‘’good and evil’’ norms determined by a particular society or social situation. Morality may be defined as a set of rules or principles generated from a behavioural norm drawn from a certain ideology, faith, or tradition, or it can be defined as a norm that someone feels should be universal. Morality is also identical with ‘’justice’’ or ‘’moral superiority.’’ In this sense, it is far more reasonable to divide morality into two groups: descriptive and normative.

In its previous sense, morality was adhering to and accepting one’s personal or cultural ideas, standards of conduct, or cultural conditions from a civilization that sets certain rules and expectations. The phrase only refers to what is seen fair or unfair and does not represent ultimate pronouncements of good and evil. On the opposite end, morality, according to its prescriptive meaning, refers to whether an action is truly good or terrible, which may be independent of any particular community’s or culture’s customs or value system. Normative ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with morality in this way.

Ethics, on the other hand, is derived from a Greek word, ‘’ethos,’’ which signifies ‘’way of life,’’ is a discipline of philosophy that focuses on human actions, primarily the attitudes of individuals within a society. Ethics investigates the intellectual basis for our moral judgements; it investigates what is morally right or wrong, just or unjust. In a larger sense, ethics considers human beings and their interactions with the environment and other humans, as well as liberty, responsibility, and justice. In essence, since this aims to explore the interaction that occurs among individuals and the environment, ethics is centred on human autonomy. This detachment is essential in ethical decision-making and any impartial study of facts. People exhibit freedom when they prefer to separate themselves as closely as appropriate from their training throughout a decision-making cycle. It will be realized that determining ethical judgments is challenging in as much as this process presupposes a level of clarity that enables us to assess independently and select which course to go to.

Starting from the above, we may differentiate between the two as follows: ethics is concerned with the act of identifying what is good and bad, which might involve assessing the advantages and drawbacks or opposing virtues and goals. Morality, on the other hand, is a rule of action that is typically founded on religious ideas and informs everyday ethical judgments. If we define ethics as the binding and objectivity of our judgments, or morality as how right or bad action is, what role may language play in defining them? Does the language we use influence our ethical and moral decisions? While such analysis is not known or trendy, I consider it necessary to discuss my findings as a linguist.

Does Language Influence Ethical-Moral Decisions?

Using the research of Boaz Keysar, Sayuri Hayakawa, and Sun Gyu An, I will attempt to explain if learning a foreign language influences our decision-making and moral awareness. These researchers discovered that speaking in a non-native language influences the substance of our judgements and conclusions more than thinking in one’s language. In their article, The Foreign-Language Effect: Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases writers explain that thinking and reasoning appear to entail two sorts of activities. The first type is somewhat more analytic, rule-governed, and systematic, whereas the second is intuitive, emotive, and heuristic. On the one hand, there are compelling grounds to conclude that speaking a second language decreases an individual’s capacity to depend on more methodical procedures. This is due to the difficulty of acquiring a new language, which may raise the cognitive load and lead to a higher dependence on instinctive and emotive processes. If this theory of diminished principles and parameters is correct, then multilingualism should increase particular choice distortions caused by heuristics and emotional processes.

On the other hand, there are grounds to assume that acquiring a new language may have the reverse consequence, increasing people’s reliance on systematic procedures and therefore minimizing choice biases. This theory’s fundamental premise is that acquiring a second language probably serves as an euclidean distance, luring learners away from their immediate intuitive system and toward a more methodical mode of thought. A second language may impart more distance since it is less ingrained in the mental condition than a mother tongue. But individuals react less passionately to phrases, berates, pledges of love, and commercial slogans in a foreign language when they fully understand their connotations, as shown by subjective judgments. A second language is frequently received less naturally than a native tongue, necessitating more deliberate processing. This may be another cognitive feature of isolation. As a result, the authors of this study, Boaz Keysar, Sayuri L. Hayakawa, and Sun Gyu An, focused on the measurement of individuals’ decision-making and emotions when speaking a second language.

Using a different language, citing the study above, diminishes emotional reaction, resulting in a cognitive detachment from emotional concerns while making moral judgments. Following two experiments, the researchers arrived at this conclusion. The ‘’trolley dilemma’’ was employed in each of these investigations to explore the premise that participants are more inclined to adopt a utilitarian perspective to moral decisions when they are presented in a foreign language. During the initial experiment, participants were shown how to cope with the trolley dilemma’s ‘’footbridge’’ situation. People were instructed to picture themselves standing on a footbridge above a railway track.

Then, they had to imagine that an incoming train was about to murder five people and that it could be prevented if they pushed someone off of the bridge. This meant that volunteers had the option of purposefully losing one person to rescue five people or being passive and allowing five others to perish. The scientists determined that when the issue was offered in a foreign tongue, more individuals representing France, Spain, the United States, Israel, and Korea chose to execute a single individual to rescue five - the utilitarian choice. Regardless of whether the language groups were randomized, participants have still been two times more likely to choose this choice. However, the problem was given lesser dramatic in the second trial. The next scenario was offered to the respondents: a train is heading towards five persons, however, if the attendees wished to, they might also divert the vehicle towards another route where it would simply kill a single person. People in this area were more likely to intentionally kill one individual in an effort to save five. Regardless of whether introduced with the decision in their mother tongue or a second one, eighty per cent picked the utilitarian approach.

According to Keysar, judgements made in a foreign language often come as a result. He continues by saying that while thinking in a second language, individuals are less afraid of failure, more willing to take risks, and far less emotionally invested. On the other hand, Sayuri Hayakawa, a co-author and psychology doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, thinks that how we learn a language is crucial. One learns their native language as a child, and it eventually becomes a part of their heritage and tradition.

A new research that appeared in the journal Cognition further tips the scales in favor of this theory. This latest study explored hypotheticals in which good deeds resulted in undesirable results. For example, an individual offers a homeless man a winter coat, but others attack him because they believe he, the homeless man, stole it. Another case is indicated in which desirable results were achieved despite doubtful motivations. Such as to get funding from the government, a couple adopts a crippled child. Participants who read these in a different language as opposed to their mother tongue tended to value results more highly and purposes less highly when forming moral judgements. These psychologists’ trials demonstrate how emotional and rational judgements are made in a foreign language. However, some terms, such as ‘’goyim,’’ may also have ethical and moral connotations in various communities. In Turkish societies, a term comparable to this case can be found. For example, the term ‘’gavur’’ is commonly used to refer to immoral and non-Muslim individuals. Although there is no counterpart in English, this phrase is also employed in Turkish culture in a strict context. When one labels someone a ‘’gavur’’ one is saying that he or she is not empathetic, cruel, or morally deficient.

Conclusion

In general, these studies show that when we think and express ourselves in a language that is not our native tongue, we are less perceptive. This is because anytime we adopt a more careful and systematic way of thought, we actually obstruct our judgmental processes. The premise that underpins this research is that we would naturally have a stronger emotional response in the language we are most familiar with, excluding the dialect in which those first distressing memories were produced. So, the recollections that are carried via discourse are closely related to those memories.0-